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Abstract 
 Japan achieved phenomenal economic growth after WWII. Starting in the early 1990s, 
however, the Japanese economy began experiencing a prolonged deflation-stagnation period 
widely known as the “Lost Decades”. Based on data from the World Bank and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, this paper employs an autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) 
model to find evidence of a long run relation among the real GDP, real imports, the real 
exchange rate, and the public debt-to-GDP ratio for Japan. Once cointegration is established with 
the Bounds Test, Granger Causality tests are performed by employing an estimated Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model with the same variables. The empirical results support Granger 
causality in all directions. In particular, we found real imports and public debt-to-GDP ratio to 
directly cause real GDP. Interestingly, the real exchange rate causes real GDP indirectly via 
imports. The public debt had a negative effect on GDP but did not wreak havoc on the Japanese 
economy. The study also examines whether former Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s unprecedented 
macroeconomic policies and structural reforms launched in 2013, known as Abenomics, are 
pulling Japan out of its economic doldrums. 
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1 Introduction: Japan, a reluctant trading partner 
 Japan, because of its scarcity of natural resources, benefits more than most other 
countries from international trade relations. The Japanese, however, according to historical 
evidence, did not seek to open trade relations with the Western countries on their own. Japan’s 
first contact with Western countries was anything but smooth. The exploitative colonial approach 
of the European traders and their persistent efforts to convert the Japanese to Catholicism led to 
much hostility among the Japanese.1 Unfair trading practices by the Europeans led the Japanese 
to expel the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch traders. Thus in 1639, Japan closed the borders to 
Western nations.   
Japan’s next official contact with the West occurred in 1851, more than two hundred 
years later, when the American Commodore Matthew Perry, authorized by US President Millard 
Fillmore, entered the Bay of Tokyo with four ships. Perry’s aim was to open trade relations with 
Japan, and he tried to accomplish this by bearing gifts for the emperor and other officials along 
with threats from the fire power of his ships. Trade relations were imposed upon the Japanese on 
March 31, 1854, when Commodore Perry returned to Tokyo with a larger squadron of ships. The 
Japanese, albeit angered and humiliated, reluctantly signed the Kanagawa Treaty.2 This treaty 
gave the US steamships access to two Japanese coaling ports. In addition, the Japanese 
government agreed to assist stranded US ships and American seamen (whalers) at risk in 
Japanese waters. An official commercial treaty, the Harris Treaty, was signed by the United 
States and Japan a few years later in 1858.  
Although Japan was forced to accept trade relations practically at gunpoint, opening its 
economy turned out to be exceptionally beneficial.3 Japan was able to access advanced 
technology for all sectors of the economy including the military. As a result, Japan was gradually 
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transformed into the most powerful economic and military power in the Pacific. Japan has 
undergone several stages of industrialization since the opening of its economy. However, much 
of its industrial base and infrastructure was destroyed during WWII, a period when Japan was at 
war against the Allied Forces. After WWII, the US assisted Japan in rebuilding its economy.  
The post-WWII phenomenal growth in the Japanese economy was interrupted by a period 
of chronic stagnation and deflation, known as the “Lost Decades”.  Set against this background, 
this study has several objectives. First, it provided a comprehensive review of the economic 
causes of the Lost Decades as well as the major policy responses, with a focus on the stimulation 
plans of former Prime Minister Shinzō Abe. Second, an ARDL model was estimated to study the 
long run relationship among important macroeconomic variables; a variety of Granger causality 
tests were then performed to investigate the nexus among them. Finally, this paper critically 
assessed the success of Abenomics based on the estimated econometric model. Since public debt 
had a rather small impact on real GDP, the massive public debt in Japan should not be identified 
as the sole cause for the lost decades. Nevertheless, the Japanese government should be cautious 
in mounting public debt on the road to reform.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 discusses the major historical 
events and policy changes related to the Lost Decades. Section 3 reviews extant economic 
studies, both theoretical and empirical, that addressed the policy responses. Section 4 explains 
the employed methodology and data. Section 5 contains the empirical results and policy 
discussion. Section 6 concludes.  
2 A Bubble Interrupts Expansion:  Policy Responses 
 Following a period of rapid growth, a major bubble formed in Japan’s real estate and 
stock markets, causing asset prices to skyrocket in the late 1980s. In 1989, the Nikkei stock 
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market index surpassed 38,000, a record high. In 1991, however, the inevitable happened and the 
bubble burst. What followed was an unprecedented period of chronic stagnation and deflation 
branded as the “Lost Decades.” A number of factors had contributed to the formation of the 
Japanese asset bubble. Ultra-expansionary monetary policy kept interest rates exceptionally low 
for a very long time. Several corporations reported high profits based on capital gains, enabling 
them to borrow at incredibly low interest rates and employ these funds for speculative 
investments. In addition, relatively high household savings were used to increase demand for 
equity and real estate assets. Such monetary innovations were called “Zaitech”4 which translates 
in English to “financial engineering”, Zestos (2016)5  
Prior to the formation of the asset bubble, the Japanese economy was internationally 
competitive in several industries, including electronics, machinery, and automobiles. This 
success resulted from the transformation of the traditional Japanese economy into a modern one, 
dominated by large corporations organized and strategically positioned for global competition. 
Japanese corporations recruited and trained many employees who became faithful and remained 
with the same companies for a lifetime. The tradition of lifetime employment prevailed in Japan 
for over a century and it was the outcome of cooperation between business management, labor, 
and the Japanese government. Furthermore, the Japanese government guided corporations to 
compete internationally. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was created in 
1949 to coordinate trade policy along with other government agencies. A successful export 
sector allowed Japan to purchase high quality capital and technology-intensive imports that 
played a favorable role in the growth of the economy.  
 In the late 1990s, Japan nevertheless experienced a major asset bubble. Consequently, the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ)6 began raising interest rates, causing the Japanese economy to enter a 
prolonged period of deflation and stagnation (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). The BOJ was criticized 
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for not being more aggressive or announcing a target inflation rate. As a response to the 
stagnation-deflation problem, both the BOJ and the Japanese Treasury contributed to the massive 
increase in government bonds. Such a massive increase in public debt led to a zero bound 
interest rate, a phenomenon that had never been explored by other major central banks (Nakano 
and Okabe, 2012). Many economists, including Leigh (2010), Grabowiecki and Dabrowski 
(2017), and Krugman (1998), were convinced that a liquidity trap was responsible for the low, 
below trend economic growth. 
 The crisis created many problems, including high unemployment among the young and 
middle-aged which contributed to a higher income inequality. Lost government revenues due to 
stagnation affected the ability of the government to assist the aging population. Government 
efforts to cope with the crisis required increasing public deficits that gradually raised the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio to an unprecedented level.  
 The question arises: how could, after more than 20 years of stagnation and unprecedented 
increases in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, interest rates on government bonds did not rise? Such 
an increase would have been explained by rising default risk premia necessary to finance the 
public debt7.  The fact that Japan’s public debt has not wreaked havoc is attributed to many 
factors; one such factor is a relatively high private saving rate compared to other developed 
countries. In addition, approximately 92% of the Japanese public debt is domestically owned. 
There is evidence of home bias among Japanese investors. Furthermore, because of the European 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, many international investors who preferred to invest in a safe-haven 
country, began purchasing short-term Japanese government bonds. As the Eurocrisis has waned, 
nonetheless, the purchase of government bonds by international investors has declined but 
investors still purchased yen for carry trade. 
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However, several unique factors characterize the Japanese economy. For example, 
although the real Japanese GDP growth rate was substantially reduced for many years, the 
Japanese economy still ranks the fourth in the world in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) 
rates. Consequently, the Japanese enjoy high standard of living.8 Furthermore, Japan is the 
largest creditor in the world. Despite such success, the Japanese government had been applying 
incorrect fiscal policy by increasing public consumption and decreasing public investment (see 
Akram, 2014). 
2.1 Abenomics 
 Upon his reelection in December 2012 as the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzō Abe, 
along with the newly appointed governor of the BOJ, Harunciko Kuroda, announced a set of new 
policies to revive the Japanese economy (Guillemette and Starsky, 2015). The three policies 
listed below are known as “The Three Arrows” of Abenomics:  
1.  Accommodative Monetary Policy 
2. Fiscal Policy followed by consolidation 
3. Structural Reforms to induce private investment and raise economic growth 
The first arrow, Accommodative Monetary Policy, aimed to increase inflation to an annual target 
rate of 2% to overcome the chronic deflation problem. To achieve this objective, the BOJ 
launched the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing, commonly known as QE monetary 
program. The BOJ initially purchased an extraordinarily large amount of long-term government 
bonds, quickly doubling its total holdings. The second arrow, fiscal policy followed by 
consolidation, employed fiscal policy to raise real GDP growth and to reduce the public debt-to-
GDP ratio.  
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  The first two arrows employed monetary and fiscal policies. These two policies alone, 
however, would not have been sufficient to achieve the ultimate objectives of Abenomics unless 
complemented by the third arrow, the structural reforms. Such reforms included increasing labor 
force participation rate of female and older workers. In addition, an elaborate deregulation 
program of the economy was launched. 
  Abenomics aimed to resolve the deep-rooted deflation-stagnation problem of the 
Japanese economy that emerged after the 1991 financial crisis. Deflationary expectations created 
by the crisis had become self-fulfilling (Bojkova, 2017). Price expectations in Japan were, for a 
long time, backward-looking.9 Low energy prices were an additional obstacle for the BOJ’s efforts 
to reverse backward looking expectations of prices. Prices, however, started rising on November 
2021. 
  The aggressive BOJ monetary policy of QE aimed to increase inflation by establishing 
negative short and long-term interest rates. To achieve this objective, the BOJ also switched to 
purchasing long-term government bonds instead of short-term bonds. The BOJ’s aim was to 
flatten and even invert the yield curve.10 Despite the massive increase in liquidity, a new 
consumption tax contributed to a minor recession in 2014. It is suspected that excessive liquidity 
did not end up in the real economy and did not boost domestic production; instead, it was simply 
absorbed by the financial sector (Xing, 2016). 
Abenomics could have been more effective if it were not preceded by an earthquake and 
tsunami that caused the tragic explosion (meltdown) of the Fukushima Daishi nuclear power plant 
on March 11, 13, and 15, 2011.11 These natural disasters worked against Abenomics. Preliminary 
data regarding the performance of the Japanese economy during the launch of Abenomics 
indicated mixed results. The inflation rate never reached its target of 2%. There was, nevertheless, 
a modest increase in output (Hausman and Wieland, 2015). A reduction in unemployment from 
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4.2% in 2013 to 3% in October 2016 took place without a substantial increase in nominal or real 
wages.12 Recent unfavorable international economic developments, such as Brexit, exchange rate 
volatility, the breakdown of multilateral international trade negotiations, trade wars, and the 
Pandemic, have worked against Abenomics.13  
2.2 Exchange Rate Developments  
Under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, the nominal exchange rate in 1971 
was set at 308 yen per dollar. When Japan joined the floating exchange rate system in 1973, the 
yen appreciated substantially to 270 yen per dollar. In the 1985 Plaza Accord, the US, Germany, 
France, and Japan agreed to intervene in the foreign exchange markets by coordinating economic 
policies to prevent further dollar appreciation. The dynamics of real exchange rate in Japan is 
depicted in Figure 1 of Section 4.2. Following the Plaza Accord, the yen rapidly appreciated until 
1988. After a couple of years of depreciation until 1990, the yen appreciated again until 1995. A 
stronger yen had a negative impact on the international competitiveness of Japan, since the 
country’s export prices increased substantially. A nominal yen appreciation reduced the Japanese 
price level, thus leading to deflation.  
  Starting in 1995, the real yen began a long depreciation path, following a volatile upward 
trend. Long subintervals of substantial oscillations took place, indicating that the yen exchange 
rate was unstable. For example, during the period from 2007 to 2015, the yen completed a half 
cycle consisting of both appreciation and depreciation. From 2007 to 2012, a period during which 
the US Subprime Mortgage crisis began and spread to Europe, the yen appreciated. Such yen 
appreciation was explained because investors reduced demand for dollars and euros. Currency 
speculators and other financial investors during this period sought a safe haven and thus invested 
in yen. This led to the appreciation of the Japanese currency.  
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When the US Subprime Mortgage crisis and the Eurocrisis were mostly subdued by 
2012, the demand for yen declined and the Japanese currency began depreciating again until 
2015. A cheaper yen was expected to have restored the Japanese international competitiveness, 
especially in relation to the South East Asian countries that had seriously challenged the 
Japanese exports sector. In addition, monetary and fiscal policy under Abenomics, starting in 
2013, reduced both short and long-term interest rates, driving them to zero-lower bound and even 
negative. Low interest rates discouraged investment in Japan, as a result, the yen depreciated. A 
yen depreciation, however, only mildly improved the Japanese trade balance.  
3 Literature Review 
3.1 Causes of the “Lost Japanese Decades” 
Several explanations are provided for the prolonged stagnation-deflation period of Japan.  
Almost all studies begin with the late 1980s and early 1990s financial crisis which peaked in 
1991. Many studies attribute the origin of the crisis to the formation of a bubble created by an 
excessive increase in money supply and liberal credit policies that induced a large demand for 
financial and real estate assets (discussed in Section 2). Eventually, the bubble burst. Although 
bubble crises are not uncommon among countries, the prolonged stagnation-deflation of Japan is 
rare and unique. The yen appreciation after the Plaza Agreement in 1985 is considered a major 
factor of the prolonged deflation-stagnation problem.  
Two alternative hypotheses provide explanations of the crisis; these are classified either 
as supply-side or demand-side theories. The supply-side theories mainly focus on the decrease of 
labor productivity and the declining labor force due to an aging population. Demand-side 
theories focus on the real yen appreciation effects on the real economy after the Plaza 
Agreement. These theories also analyze the monetary and fiscal policy responses by the BOJ and 
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the Japanese government respectively, to cope with the crisis which created a liquidity trap.14 
The ultra-expansionary monetary policy triggered a liquidity trap that rendered monetary policy 
impotent. Furthermore, deficit spending led to the mounting public debt problem. A high public 
debt-to-GDP ratio required large interest payments which hindered economic development15.  
In a recent study, Nersisyan and Wray (2021) noted that while Japan has the highest 
public debt-to-GDP ratio in the world, the country has not been negatively affected because of its 
low interest rate. Furthermore, the two authors emphasized that the main reason Japan did not 
quickly recover from the stagnation is because its fiscal policy was not sufficiently effective 
during times of recessions. Thus, Japanese fiscal policy was characterized by stop-and-go steps 
reversing course from expansionary to contractionary prior to recoveries 
Fukao (2013) observed that the Japanese capital-to-GDP ratio has been increasing since 
the mid-1970s. Therefore, he concluded that the rise in the capital-to-GDP ratio contributed to 
the decline of the marginal product of capital and subsequently to a decrease in the rate of return 
to capital. In addition, Fukao observed not only that the accumulation of information technology 
was low in comparison to capital accumulation, but it was lower for Small and Medium sized 
Enterprises (SMEs). Although large firms had started moving production facilities abroad to 
avoid the yen appreciation problem and the US tariffs, low accumulation of technology had a 
negative impact on the SMEs efficiency. Such a phenomenon resulted in a reduction in the 
productivity of the SMEs, which constitute a large share of the Japanese economy and thus 
played a role to the stagnation-deflation problem.16  
Jiang et al. (2020) and Fokuda and Doita (2016) address the question of why the new QE 
policy launched by the BOJ in April 2013, which led to yen depreciation, did not trigger a 
significant increase in Japanese real exports and therefore to GDP. Two main reasons contributed 
to the slow increase in Japanese exports after the launch of the QE policy. The first pertains to 
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the slowdown of the global economy that resulted in reduction in the external demand for 
Japanese exports. The second reason is the appreciation of the yen during the global financial 
crisis starting in 2008. Since then, Japanese corporations began moving production abroad, thus 
an outward bound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increased substantially at the expense of 
exports.17  
Unlike the liquidity trap explanation for the prolonged stagnation, Yoshino and 
Taghizadeh-Hesary (2015) attributed the Japanese lost decades to chronic structural problems of 
the economy, particularly to the aging population and the unwillingness to invest in SMEs 
startups due to Basel international banking regulations. Such rigidities resulted in a vertical IS 
curve, indicating that investment is totally insensitive to interest rate changes. Therefore, a zero 
bound interest rate had no effect on investment and GDP. Subsequently, the authors concluded 
that only major structural corrections could help Japan out of the prolonged stagnation-deflation 
problem. Tyers (2012) attributes the Japanese slowdown to the emergence of China as a major 
world exporting economy. The rise of China coincides with the beginning of the Japanese 
economic stagnation-deflation period. This occurred in 1985 after the Plaza Agreement when the 
yen started appreciating.     
3.2 Economic Development and Trade Theories 
Two opposite schools of thought have emerged from at least the 18th century regarding 
the effects of international trade on economic development. The first school includes authors 
who support free trade and recognize the beneficial effects of opening up national economies to 
the world via trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and capital flows. Starting with Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo, free trade proponents convinced many that free trade is the optimal 
policy. Several authors support the view that open trade policies are beneficial to countries 
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because expansion of production to meet foreign demand allows firms to move along their long 
run average cost curve, enabling them to achieve economies of scale and become internationally 
competitive. Thus, the export-led growth (ELG) hypothesis was formulated and has emerged as 
the dominant trade policy.  
 Opponents of free international trade, on the contrary, advocate protectionism as the 
optimal trade policy. Protectionists, also known as mercantilists, are firm believers that countries 
should trade if and only if they generate persistent trade surpluses.18 Protectionists adopted the 
import substitution theory which requires a country to produce and consume domestic goods 
instead of relying on imports. The most known proponent of this theory is Raúl Prebich (1962).19 
The Balanced Growth theory was proposed by Nurkse (1961) according to this theory all sectors 
of an economy are supported and expanded proportionally. Such a theory that is almost forgotten 
can presently gain popularity and support in an environment dominated by trade wars and 
suspicions. 
The impact of international trade on economic development has been widely studied. 
Helpman and Krugman (1989), Balassa (1978, 1985), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1979), Feder 
(1983), Ben-David and Loewy (1998), Harbeler (1978), Tao and Zestos (1999), Frankel and 
Romer (1999), Zestos and Tao (2002), Awokuse (2014), and Krueger (1978) are just a few of the 
many theoretical and empirical studies in this literature. In a more recent study, Zestos et al. 
(2016) provide statistical evidence that persistent trade surpluses in the Northern Eurozone 
countries in relation to the Southern Eurozone members Granger caused public indebtedness to 
their trading partners in Southern Europe. The fiscal situation deteriorated such that five 
Eurozone members counties: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus had to be jointly bailed 
out by the IMF and the EU to avoid bankruptcy.20 In light of this literature, we present two 
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econometric models that allow the real GDP to be flexibly driven by imports, exchange rate, and 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
 
4  Methodology 
4.1 The ARDL Model 
 The autoregressive distributed lags model (ARDL) is employed to investigate Granger 
causal relations of the Japanese real GDP with real imports, real exchange rate, and public debt. 
The model was developed by Pesaran, et al. (2001). The ARDL model investigates evidence of 
cointegration among a set of time series variables expressed in levels using the Bounds Test. In 
addition, the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) complements the 
ARDL model by testing for Granger econometric causality among a group of time series 
variables.21 The ARDL-VAR methodology can be employed as long as the time series variables 
are not integrated of order two, I(2), or higher.  
 The conditional or unrestricted ARDL model in this study consists of four variables that 
are characterized by different orders of integration up to I(1), therefore the ability to 
accommodate flexible integration orders makes the ARDL-VAR framework applicable in this 
study.  The dependent variable of the single equation ARDL model is the natural logarithm of 
the real Japanese GDP, denoted as lnYt. The three right-hand side variables are: the natural 
logarithm of real imports (lnMt), the natural logarithm of the real exchange rate (lnERt) 
expressed as numbers of yen per dollar, and the natural logarithm of the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
(lnPDt). 
 The three variables were selected after a careful screening among a group of possible 
alternatives. The two criteria for this selection were the required dynamic properties of the time 
series variables for the ARDL model and the plausibility of the empirical results of the estimated 
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model.  The ARDL model also includes as right-hand side variables all the one-period lagged 
variables in levels: 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑛 𝑀𝑡−1 , 𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑅𝑡−1, and 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐷𝑡−1, and a number of optimal lagged 
differences of all the variables of order r, s, k and p respectively. The ARDL model is presented 
in equation (1) below: 
(1) ∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛 𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛼3 𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑎4𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=1 +
                              ∑ 𝛼2𝑖∆ 𝑙𝑛 𝑀𝑡−𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛼3𝑖∆ 𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=0 + ∑ 𝛼4𝑖∆ 𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=0 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
where t=1, 2, 3…, and 𝛼𝑖𝑗′𝑠 are parameters to be estimated and  𝜀𝑡 is the usual white noise error 
term. Furthermore, ∆ denotes the first difference of the variables.   
Based on the estimated ARDL model of equation (1), the existence of a long run 
relationship can be tested by examining the joint significance of the coefficients of the one-
period lagged variables. We employ the Bounds Test proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) where 
two sets of critical values are calculated: one assuming all regressors are I(0), and the other 
assuming that they are I(1). To be specific, the null and alternative hypotheses of the Bounds 
Test are stated respectively as 𝐻0 (𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛): 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼3 = 𝛼4 = 0 and 
 𝐻𝑎:  𝐻0 ,not true. If the computed Wald F-test statistic falls below the lower critical value bound 
or above the upper critical value bound it is concluded either to accept or reject the null 
hypothesis. However, if the Wald F-test statistic falls inside the critical bound values, the test is 
inconclusive.  
 
4.2 Data and Variable Descriptions 
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Figure 1: Time plots of the variables of this study 
Figure 1 above depicts the time plots of the four variables employed in the study. In the upper 
part of Figure 1 the real Japanese GDP (Y) and the real imports (M) are presented, in the left and 
right; both variables are expressed in 2010 trillion of Japanese yen. The time plot shows Y has a 
positive trend, indicating that the Japanese economy has been growing almost throughout the 
sample period, 1980-2016. One or more structural breaks may be present in Y, including an 
intercept change in 2008-2009 corresponding to the US Subprime Mortgage Crisis. The time plot 
of the real imports (M) shows a similar pattern as that of the Y.  
In the lower part of Figure 1, the real exchange rate of the yen (ER) and the public debt- 
to-GDP ratio (lnPD) are presented. The real exchange rate is expressed as the numbers of yen per 
US dollar22. The real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for the relative price 
levels of the US and Japan. The nominal exchange rate fluctuated substantially since Japan 
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abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime in 1973. As a result, the lnER oscillated substantially 
as well. The data for the first three variables comes from the World Bank. 
 The last variable, public debt, depicted in the bottom-right of Figure 1 is measured as the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio (PD).  Data for PD comes from the Economic Database (FRED) of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. The PD is a crucial macroeconomic indicator of the long-
term fiscal stability of a country. For Japan, the PD constitutes an exceptionally interesting and 
unique case study. In 1980, the Japanese PD stood close to 50 percent; it more than quadrupled 
by 2016. With the exception for a few years near 1990, the PD has kept rising. In 2016, Japan’s 
PD was the highest among all developed countries as it is shown in Figure 1A in the Appendix. 
However, the high Debt-to-GDP ratio has not yet affected the default risk premium of the 
government bonds. Despite the stripping by the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) the AAA-rated 
status of the Japanese government bonds in 1998, the 10-year government bond yield has 
remained lower than two percent23.       
 
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Unit Root Tests 
Prior to proceeding with the estimation of the econometric model, the dynamic properties 
of the four time series variables were investigated by carrying out four different unit root tests for 
each variable. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (1979, ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (1988, PP) 
tests were first performed. However, these two commonly used tests have been criticized for 
being unreliable in small samples, such as the Japanese sample in this study. The criticism of 
these two tests is serious, as they tend to over reject a correct null hypothesis and accept a false 
one. To investigate the validity of this claim, we employed two other unit root tests: The Dickey-
Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) test introduced by Elliott et al., (1996) and the NG-
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Perron test, (2001). According to these unit root tests the natural logarithms of output (lnYt), 
imports (lnMt), and real exchange rate (lnERt) are integrated either of order I(0) or of I(1), so we 
were able to employ them in the estimation of the ARDL model. However, the natural logarithm 
of public debt (lnPDt) was found to be I(1) only when the test is carried out with a constant. 
When the test is carried out with a constant and a trend, the lnPDt was not stationary in the first 
differences and hence could not be employed in the ARDL model. From the graph of lnPD in 
Figure 1, it is clear that lnPD has a trend and thus the unit root test result cannot be ignored24.  
Perron (1989) pointed out structural change and unit root tests are closely related. Thus, 
researchers should bear in mind that conventional unit root tests are biased towards accepting a 
false unit root null when the data is trended and has structural breaks.25 Since the graphs reported 
in the previous section plausibly suggest the existence of structural breaks, it is important to 
perform unit root tests which explicitly allow the presence of multiple structural breaks.  
Specifically, we employed a modified version of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
proposed by Perron (1989) and also by Carrion-i-Silvestre, Kim and Perron (2009). The test 
allows each variable to have multiple structural breaks in both the trend and the intercept. The 
break dates were left unspecified and were determined empirical by the data via the Carrion-i-
Silvestre, Kim and Perron (2009) unit root test procedure. The break dates and unit root test 
results for all four variables are reported in Table 1 below. Specifically, we found lnYt and lnPDt 
are non-stationary in levels but stationary in the first differences, while lnERt and lnMt are 
stationary in levels. That is, after accounting for structural break(s), none of the time series is 
I(2), therefore the requirement of ARDL model is met. 
Table 1 Carrion-i-Silvestre, Kim and Perron (2009) Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks 
Variable Break year Integration order 
Output (lnYt) 2009 I(1) 
Imports (lnMt) 1987,2008 I(0) 
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Public debt (lnPDt) 1991 I(1) 
Exchange rate (lnERt) 1985,1995,2008 I(0) 
 
 Moreover, the unit root tests identify one structural break for lnY in 2009, which 
coincides with the end of the US Subprime Mortgage Crisis. The US Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
during 2008-2009 also caused structural breaks in imports and the real exchange rate. The real 
exchange rate is found to have two other structural breaks, one in 1985 and the other in 1995, 
which coincide with the Plaza Accord and the 1995 reversal of the real exchanges rate trend, 
respectively.   
5.2 The Estimated ARDL Model 
 The estimated ARDL model is reported in Table 2 below. This model is referred to as (5, 
5, 3, 0). The numbers inside the parenthesis refer to the lagged values included in the model for 
both the dependent and independent variables. The model also includes a dummy variable 
capturing a structural break for the last two years of the US Subprime Mortgage Crisis. The 
dummy variable takes the value of one for 2008 and 2009 and zero elsewhere. As indicated in 
Pesaran et. al (2001), including a break dummy does not affect the cointegration test. The sample 
of the time series data set spans the period 1980 - 2016, a total of 37 observations. Below the 
dependent variable, lnY, are the three right-hand side variables: lnMt, lnERt, and lnPDt.   
According to the estimated model, several coefficients are statistically significant. The 
coefficient of the break turned out to be negative and highly significant as expected. The Durbin 
Watson (DW) statistic is 2.10, which indicates that serial correlation is unlikely to be present in 
the estimated model.  In addition, to reaffirm that the model was free from serial correlation, the 
Breush-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was performed as well. The estimated ARDL 
model passes the test at 5% level of significance. The results of the Breush-Godfrey serial 
correlation test are reported in Table 3 adjacent to Table 2. 
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming 14 (2022)
www.RofEA.org




Based on the above estimated ARDL model, the Bounds Test for cointegration was 
performed and is reported in Table 4 below. The test statistic of the Bounds Test is 31.83, which 
is exceptionally high. This value exceeds the upper bound critical values provided by Pesaran et 
al., (2001) at any conceivable level of significance. Therefore there is strong statistical evidence 
of cointegration. 
Table 2 Estimated Conditional Unrestricted 
ARDL Model 
 
Table 3 - Breusch-Godfrey Serial 



















lnYt-3  0.1517 
lnYt-4 -0.2116* 
lnYt-5 0.4015*** 
lnM t                               0.2679*** 
lnM t-1   
lnM t-2   
lnM t-3   
lnM t-4      







lnER t-1  
lnER t-2                               








*, **, *** represent the significance levels of 
.10, .05, .01 respectively. 
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Table 4 Critical Values for Bounds Test 
Estimated Statistics   
Model F-Statistic       DF 
 
k=3 31.83               32             
Significance Level I(0) Bound I(1) Bound 
  
10% 2.676 3.586 
  
5% 3.272 4.306 
  
1% 4.614 5.966 
  
Note: k denotes the number of independent variables in the model. 
 The estimated unconditional ARDL model reported in Table 2 has also generated the 
cointegration equation of the four variables. The cointegration equation presented below 
describes an explicit long run relation of the included variables,  
 (2)          lnYt    =         18.5735 +   0.4907lnMt +    0.1614lnERt  -  0.2061lnDebtt 
              p-value            (0.00)        (0.00)                (0.01)               (0.00) 
According to the estimated cointegration equation, the real Japanese GDP is positively 
related to the real imports. This is a plausible result: an increase of real Japanese imports 
contributes to an increase in Japanese real exports and thus increasing GDP. This happens 
because imports consisted mainly of high technology capital goods. It can be predicted that when 
M increases by a certain percentage, Y will increase by about half of that percentage.26 This is 
the case because the elasticity of Y with respect to imports, EY.M, is 0.49.  
The elasticity of Y with respect to  the real exchange rate, EY.ER, is 0.16 implying that 
when the yen depreciates by 100 percent, Y, will increase by approximately 16 percent. Lastly, 
the relationship of Y with respect to PD is negative, unlike the other two variables. Such a 
relationship is plausible because a high PD is a deterrent factor to economic growth. High levels 
of PD require large annual interest payments to service it. The elasticity of Y with respect to PD, 
EY.PD, is -0.20, which is relatively low. Such a low value of output-PD elasticity, nevertheless, is 
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not very surprising because Japan has endured many years without a major collapse of its 
economy. Therefore, the high PD was not very detrimental to the Japanese economy.   
Another form of the same estimated ARDL model, known as the Long Run Error 
Correction Model (ECM), is presented below in Table 5. The main feature of this version of the 
ARDL is that it includes the one-period lagged Error Correction term (ECt-1) of the cointegrating 
equation as an additional right-hand side variable. According to this estimated model, the  
coefficient of the ECt-1  is negative, large in absolute value, and highly significant. This implies 
that if the cointegrated variables deviate from their long run equilibrium values, they will adjust 
rather quickly to return to their long run equilibrium values. Specifically, the model predicts that 
42.07 percent of the adjustment will take place within the first year. 
Table 5 Estimated Long Run ECM of the ARDL Model 
Sample: 1980-2016 
Dependent Variable                 Independent Variables  
 lnYt                                        ΔlnMt, ΔlnERt, ΔlnPDt 
  
ΔlnYt-1                                                                           -0.2664*** 
 
ΔlnYt-2                                                -0.3415*** 
ΔlnYt-3                                                 0.1898**                         
ΔlnYt-4                                                 -0.4015*** 
ΔlnMt                                                                             0.2679*** 
ΔlnMt-1                                                 0.0102 
ΔlnMt-2                                                0.0747*** 
ΔlnMt-3                                                0.0624** 
ΔlnMt-4                                                0.0767***         
ΔlnER                                                 0.0105                 
ΔlnERt-1                                              -0.0693***                 
ΔlnERt-2                                             -0.0389***                         
Break0809                                         -0.0199*** 
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ECt-1                                                    -0.4207***  
 
*, **, *** represent the levels of significance 
 
5.3 Granger Causality Tests within the framework of two estimated econometric models 
Evidence of cointegration from the Bounds Test led us investigate Granger Causality 
from the three right-hand side variables to lnYt. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) complement the 
ARDL model by showing that in a set of time series variables of differing integrating order, the 
standard asymptotic theory is valid if the order of integration does not exceed the length of the 
VAR model which is 2 in our case. Within the framework of the estimated VAR model, which is 
reported in Table 2A in the Appendix, we performed Granger causality tests. Prior to performing 
the Granger Causality tests, the estimated VAR model was tested for dynamic stability and for 
serial correlation. There is no evidence of serial correlation at 95% confidence level; the results 
of the Maximum Likelihood test for serial correlation are reported in Table 3A in the Appendix. 
The inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomials remain within the unit circle, so the 
model is characterized by dynamic stability. Results of the Inverse Roots of the Polynomial are 
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Table 6 Granger Causality tests within the estimated VAR model 
Equation Excluded  
Variables 
2 df P-values  
lnYt lnMt 5.0504 2 0.0800 
 lnERt 0.9178 2 0.6320 
 lnPDt 14.8177 2 0.0006 
 All 25.1975 6 0.0003 
lnMt lnYt 1.1637 2 0.5588 
 lnERt 5.7849 2 0.0554 
 lnPDt 13.8579 2 0.0010 
 All 24.8536 6 0.0004 
lnERt lnYt 24.5039 2 0.0000 
 lnMt 21.0530 2 0.0000 
 lnPDt 0.5813 2 0.7478 
 All 39.2529 6 0.0000 
lnPDt lnYt 4.5623 2 0.1022 
 lnMt 3.7244 2 0.1553 
 lnERt 1.4864 2 0.4756 
 All 23.5951 6 0.0006 
Note: the VAR was estimated with two lagged differences. 
 
 In Table 6 above, we report  the results of the Granger Causality test. A test for each of 
the four endogenous variables of the VAR model was performed by employing the EViews block 
exogeneity test. Such tests allowed the investigation of whether the three right-hand side 
variables in each equation of the VAR model jointly Granger cause the left-hand side variable. 
These tests employed the χ2 distribution. In addition, a t-test was also performed for each right-
hand side variable to examine whether each of the three right-hand side variables separately 
Granger caused the left-hand side variable. Consequently, the Granger causality results are 
reported for each of the four left-hand side variables. Four different joint tests were performed, 
one for each of the left-hand side variables lnY, lnM, lnER and lnPD, these variables appear in 
the first column of Table 6. In the second column the three right-hand side variables appear for 
everyone of the four tests. EViews automatically performs a Granger Causality t-test for each 
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individual right-hand side variable. The significance of each test is denoted by the p-value 
reported in the last column.    
According to the first panel of Table 6, the three right-hand side variables, lnMt, lnERt 
and lnPDt, jointly Granger cause lnYt at any conceivable level of significance, as the p-value is 
near zero. Regarding the individual t-tests, lnMt and lnPDt are statistically significant according 
to the reported p-values and therefore Granger cause lnYt individually. Interestingly, the 
exchange rate, although not individually Granger causing lnYt, affects lnYt indirectly via its 
influence on the lnMt. Such indirect Granger causality is evident from the second panel in Table 
6 wherein the dependent variable is lnMt. The three independent variables lnYt, lnERt and lnPDt, 
jointly Granger cause lnMt according to the χ
2 test. As for the individual t-statistic, lnERt and 
lnPDt, each Granger causes lnMt . Perhaps surprisingly, InYt does not cause lnMt. 
 The empirical results strongly indicate that the Japanese GDP is affected by the foreign 
sector and public debt. The high Public debt played a crucial role in prolonging the recession but 
has not wreaked havoc on the economy. The remaining variables, lnERt and lnPDt, are each 
jointly Granger-caused by the excluded three right-hand side variables. This implies that there is 
evidence of strong Granger causality among all the variables in the VAR model.  It is evident 
from the empirical results of this study that imports turned out to be the most important variable 
Granger causing lnY. Such evidence is supported also by comparing the time plot of imports and 
exports in Figure 2 below. 
 It can be seen from Figure 2 that Japan generated both trade deficits and surpluses during 
the 1980-2016 period. Nevertheless, the deficit years exceeded the surplus years. For a large 
interval of about twenty consecutive years, Japan generated only deficits. However, this cannot 
be characterized as a weakness; on the contrary, it should be considered a strength, as large 
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming 14 (2022)
www.RofEA.org
24  Japanese Nexus of Macroeconomic Relations 
 
 
shares of Japanese imports were capital goods and raw materials (including oil) that strengthened 
its ability to increase the quantity of high-quality exports (Thorbecke, 2015). It is interesting to 
note that Japan for many years became also an exporter of high-tech intensive capital goods to 
several Asian countries completing a trade cycle in the global economy. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Real Japanese Imports and Exports 
 
Concluding Comments  
The study investigates Granger causal relations of Japanese real GDP vis-à-vis three 
macroeconomic variables: real imports, real exchange rate, and public debt. According to the 
empirical results, these variables are found to jointly Granger cause real Japanese GDP. This is 
an important empirical result. Although Japan was forced to open its economy to the world some 
160 years ago, it presently enjoys the status of one of the most developed countries. Public debt 































































































Source: Import Export data comes from the World Bank, Billions of 2010 USD
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Japan’s mounting public debt did not abruptly destabilize the economy, it is highly likely to have 
played a negative role to its chronic stagnation-deflation problem. Abenomics policies, launched 
in 2013, kept the default risk premium for the Japanese public debt exceptionally low. 
Nonetheless, Abenomics seems to be working despite the recent adverse domestic and 
international developments and the recent resignation of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe. Low and 
even negative interest rates along with fiscal consolidation and structural reforms are making 
public debt financing possible. Japan is the largest creditor country in the world and accumulated 
the largest international investment position. It has also evolved to be the second largest country 
in terms of holdings of foreign currency reserves, next only to China. As a result, Japan can keep 
distancing itself from financial crises and from credit events while leveling off and even reducing 
its public debt to GDP ratio. 
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Sources of Data: Real Japanese Gross Domestic Product (Y) and Real imports (M) are 
measured in real 2010 Japanese currency units. The real exchange rate (ER) is expressed as the 
numbers of yen per US dollar, adjusted by the price levels of the two countries. The data for the 
three variables comes from the World Bank. The last variable, public debt (PD), is measured as 
the public debt to GDP ratio: PD  = Public Debt/Y.  Data for PD come from the Economic 
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Table 1A Unit Root Tests (Part 1) 
 
Japan 1980-2016 Data source: World bank        Units: Yen 
 
Levels – I(0) 
 ADF Test DF-GLS Test PP Test 
Variable  Constant Constant 
& Trend 
Lags Constant Constant 
& Trend 
Lags Constant Constant 
& Trend 
LnY AIC -4.64*** -1.89 0,0 -0.16 -1.10 1,1 
 -4.39*** -1.86 
SIC -4.64*** -1.89 0,0 -0.02 -0.94 0,0 
lnM AIC -3.26** -2.16 9,0  0.42 1.73 0,0 
-1.32 -1.52 
SIC -7.09 -2.16 0,0  0.42 1.73 0,0 
lnER AIC -2.60 -2.47 1,1 -1.12 -1.40 3,3 
-1.89 -1.56 
SIC -2.60 -2.47 1,1 -1.12 -2.17 3,1 
lnPD AIC -0.70 -0.31 1,1 -0.03 -3.22** 1,1 
-2.25 -1.83 
SIC -0.70 -0.31 1,1 -0.03 -3.22** 1,1 
 
First Differences – I(1) 
 ADF Test DF-GLS Test PP Test 
Variable  Constant Constant 
& Trend 
Lags Constant Constant 
& Trend 
Lags Constant Constant 
& Trend 
LnY AIC -3.68*** -4.73** 0,0 -3.46*** -4.87** 0,0 
-3.69** -4.73*** 
SIC -3.68*** -4.73*** 0,0 -3.46*** -4.87** 0,0 
lnM AIC -4.41*** -4.55** 2,4 -4.16*** -4.64*** 2,2 
-4.48*** -5.50*** 
SIC -4.61*** -4.76*** 0,2 -4.60 -4.73*** 0,0 
lnER AIC -4.23*** -4.55*** 2,2 -4.16*** -5.24*** 0,2 
-4.12*** -4.92*** 
SIC -4.35*** -4.38*** 0,0 -4.16*** -5.24*** 0,2 
lnPD AIC -2.67* -2.62 0,0 -2.38** -2.59 0,0 
-2.79** -2.75 
SIC -2.67* -2.62 0,0 -2.38** -2.59 0,0 
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Table 1B Unit Root Tests (Part 2): NG-Perron 
 
Japan 1980-2016 Data source: World bank        Units: Yen 
Variables 
Levels – I(0) 
CONSTANT CONSTANT&TREND 
MZa MZt MSB MPT 
la
g 
NOTE MZa MZt MSB MPT lag NOTE 
lnY 
AIC -.04 -.03 .66 27.84 1  -2.55 -.99 .39 30.94 1  
SIC .85 1.19 1.40 125.12 0  -.52 -.33 .63 80.93 0  
lnER 
AIC -2.60 -1.13 .43 9.37 3  -3.79 -1.28 .34 22.69 3  
SIC -2.60 -1.13 .43 9.37 3  -9.57 -2.12 .22 9.80 1  
lnM 
SIC .92 .76 .82 48.8 0  -9.70 -2.20 .22 9.39 0  
AIC .92 .76 .82 48.8 0  -9.70 -2.20 .22 9.39 0  
lnPD 
AIC -.32 -.17* .52 18.89 1  -23.76** -3.41** .14** 4.05** 1  
SIC -.32 -.17 .52 18.89 1  -23.76** -3.41** .14** 4.05** 1  
Variables 
First Differences – I(1) 
CONSTANT CONSTANT&TREND 
MZa MZt MSB MPT 
la
g 
NOTE MZa MZt MSB MPT lag NOTE 
lnY 
AIC -13.3** -2.56** .19** 1.93** 0  -16.97* -2.90* .17* 5.44** 0  
SIC -13.3** -2.56** .19** 1.93** 0  -16.97* -2.90* .17* 5.44** 0  
lnER 
AIC -15.7*** -2.8*** .18** 1.7*** 0  -18965*** -97.4*** .01*** .01*** 2  
SIC -15.7*** -2.8*** .18** 1.7*** 0  -18965*** -97.4*** .01*** .01*** 2  
lnM 
AIC -17.0*** -2.9*** .17*** 1.5***   -17.01*** -2.89* .17* 5.45**   
SIC -17.0*** -2.9*** .17*** 1.5***   -17.01*** -2.89* .17* 5.45**   
lnPD 
AIC -8.47** -2.01** .24* 3.08** 0  -9.37 -2.16 .23 9.72 0  
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Table 1C: Estimated VAR model   
     
     
 LNY LNM LNREERZ LNDEBT 
     
     
lnYt-1  0.361948  0.203225 -3.121108  1.112650 
  (0.23243)  (0.87437)  (1.26900)  (0.52926) 
 [ 1.55722] [ 0.23242] [-2.45951] [ 2.10227] 
     
lnYt-2  0.583456  0.101794  1.217896 -0.991845 
  (0.23275)  (0.87558)  (1.27075)  (0.52999) 
 [ 2.50676] [ 0.11626] [ 0.95841] [-1.87143] 
     
lnMt-1  0.071160  0.583850  1.426085 -0.194795 
  (0.06897)  (0.25945)  (0.37655)  (0.15705) 
 [ 1.03176] [ 2.25033] [ 3.78725] [-1.24035] 
     
lnMt-2 -0.142069 -0.031029 -0.538616  0.299441 
  (0.06975)  (0.26239)  (0.38081)  (0.15883) 
 [-2.03683] [-0.11826] [-1.41440] [ 1.88535] 
     
lnERt-1 -0.022992 -0.186100  0.755157  0.079028 
  (0.03240)  (0.12188)  (0.17689)  (0.07378) 
 [-0.70963] [-1.52690] [ 4.26908] [ 1.07120] 
     
lnERt-2 -0.000827 -0.048729 -0.173628 -0.018078 
  (0.03109)  (0.11694)  (0.16972)  (0.07079) 
 [-0.02661] [-0.41670] [-1.02302] [-0.25539] 
     
lnPDt-1 -0.199583 -0.094446 -0.170931  1.817406 
  (0.06431)  (0.24193)  (0.35112)  (0.14644) 
 [-3.10335] [-0.39038] [-0.48682] [ 12.4104] 
     
lnPDt-2  0.239385  0.338305  0.114757 -0.929401 
  (0.06663)  (0.25064)  (0.36377)  (0.15172) 
 [ 3.59286] [ 1.34975] [ 0.31547] [-6.12592] 
     
BREAK0809 -0.042270 -0.072743 -0.087520  0.038162 
  (0.01088)  (0.04093)  (0.05941)  (0.02478) 
 [-3.88471] [-1.77713] [-1.47322] [ 1.54021] 
     
C  4.029282  3.767170  38.36957 -7.119215 
  (1.59144)  (5.98669)  (8.68866)  (3.62379) 
 [ 2.53185] [ 0.62926] [ 4.41605] [-1.96458] 
     
     
R-squared  0.996357  0.990467  0.897123  0.997461 
Adj. R-squared  0.995045  0.987035  0.860087  0.996547 
     
     
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  4.49E-13   
Log likelihood  322.4642   
Akaike information criterion -16.14081   
Schwarz criterion -14.36327   
Number of coefficients  40   
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Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
 
Table 2 VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test 
 
 Dependent variable: output  
Lags LM Statistic Probability 
1 25.45 0.065 
0.301 2 36.32 
 
 Source: Real Japanese Gross Domestic Product (Y) and Real imports (M) are measured in real 
2010 Japanese currency units. The real exchange rate (ER) is expressed as the number of yen 
per US dollar, adjusted by the price levels of the two countries. The data for the three variables 
come from the World Bank. The last variable, public debt (PD), is measured as the public debt 
to GDP ratio: PD  = Public Debt/Y.  Data for PD come from the Economic Database (FRED) of 
the Saint Louis Federal Reserve Bank.   
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